D espite a European Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution in 1995 (Recommendation 1257) encouraging more limited recourse to prison sentences for women, the past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the UK's female prison estate. On May 5, 2006, the women's prison population stood at 4,400, whilst in 1995 it stood at an average of 1,998. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest an increase in the severity of the crimes that women are committing. Indeed, most of this rise can be explained by a significant increase in the severity of sentences being issued. In 2001, a woman convicted of theft or handling at the Crown Court was two times more likely to be sent to prison than she was a decade previously, and the chances of a woman receiving a custodial sentence at the magistrates' court had risen seven-fold during this period. Yet the custodial sentences imposed on women continue to be of short duration and for minor offences. Indeed, the average length of sentence imposed upon a female prisoner is 10 months, with a substantial proportion of women serving sentences of three months or less. What's more, the vast majority of female prisoners continue to be held for non-violent offences, with drug offences and theft/fraud accounting for the bulk of convictions (Home Office Remarkably, official statistics on the percentage of women in prison who are also mothers have not in the past been collated. It is estimated, however, that more than 17,700 children are separated from their mother by imprisonment every year (see J Sherlock, Young Parents: From Custody to Community, Prison Reform Trust, 2004 162, 1997) . While 71% of these women had been living with their children immediately before imprisonment, only 1% remained with them in a prison mother and baby unit. Grandparents cared for 24%, female family members or friends for 17% and 8% of the children had been placed in local authority care. Strikingly, fathers cared for only 9% of the children in this study.
Yet this contrasts sharply against surveys conducted with imprisoned fathers, which reveal that in the substantial majority of cases, children continue to be cared for by their mother or their father's partner during his imprisonment From mothering behind bars to parenting beyond barriers? The right to family life and the politics of imprisonment
by Vanessa E Munro There are, of course, a number of concerns and difficulties associated with the imprisonment of a parent. In the present article, however, my discussion will focus only on one issue, namely access to and removal from prison mother and baby units. More specifically, this paper will look at recent case law on the prison service's administration of these units in order to suggest that more might be done in this context to protect the Article 8 rights, of both an imprisoned mother and her child.
(see C Van Nijnatten, "Children in Front of Bars" (1997) Bulletin 38, 1996) . But even where the children in Caddle and Crisp's research had been living with both parents at the time of their mother's imprisonment, it was twice as likely that they would be cared for by grandparents, rather than by their father, thereafter.
While we might well question these gender dynamics, what this suggests is that the impact of imprisonment on children will often be greater where it is their mother that is incarcerated. This has been supported, moreover, by studies which illustrate that the social, behavioural and psychological difficulties generally experienced by the children of imprisoned parents are, for various reasons, intensified in cases where the mother has been removed (see J Woodrow, "Mothers inside children outside" in R Shaw (ed) Prisoners' Children: What are the issues? (Routledge, 1992) , pp 29-40; and R Shaw, "Prisoners' children and politics: an aetiology of victimisation", (1997) 4 (3) Children and Society 315 -25).
Together, then, these trends and studies have brought the issue of the treatment of imprisoned mothers and their children into sharp focus, and have led to increasing pressure upon the prison service to find new ways of maintaining, or at least properly respecting, the mother-child relationship. (Cavendish, 2000) , pp 49-70 -there is some evidence of judicial support for it. In the case of R v Mills (2002) The Times, January 14, for example, a custodial sentence imposed on a mother convicted of a dishonesty offence was overturned on the basis that she was responsible for her young children and was of previous good character.
PRISON MOTHER AND BABY UNITS: PARENTING BEYOND BARRIERS?
One further way of dealing with at least some of the issues surrounding the separation of imprisoned mothers and their children lies, of course, in the provision of prison mother and baby units: While some commentators have suggested that enforced separation of a mother and child constitutes a kind of "emotional mutilation" and have argued for the expansion of prison facilities to accommodate more children, others have suggested that the general unsuitability of the prison environment means that separation, if it must occur, should always take place at the point of imprisonment.
Settling on a compromise between these two positions, the English Prison Service has accepted that the welfare of a young child may require a brief stay with its mother in prison but has placed restrictions on such stays in recognition of the unsuitable nature of this environment for older children. As a result, Prison Service Order 4801, which deals with the provision and management of mother and baby units, has stipulated that, other than in exceptional circumstances where discretion may be exercised, children should not remain in a unit once they have reached the age of 18 months. But in a context in which the Prison Service and others have often accepted that this 18 month age limit is not supported by any compelling evidence establishing it to be the optimum age for mother-child separation, the legality and application of this policy has been the subject of a number of high profile challenges in recent years. Whilst not disputing that separation constituted an infringement of the Article 8 right to respect for family life, certainly of the mother and potentially also the child, the judgment of the court in CF focussed on the need to balance this with the right to respect for private life. More specifically, Munby J argued that respect for private life entailed the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and that since the child's ability to do this was restricted, if not obliterated, by residence in a prison mother and baby unit, a proper reading of Article 8 may in fact entail, rather than contraindicate, enforced separation.
Since the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, decisions in cases such as R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 have indicated that
there is a need for the court to engage in a more detailed and rights-oriented scrutiny of the actions of public bodies, including the Prison Service. Certainly, the Court of Appeal in P&Q, while acknowledging the need to show appropriate deference to the expertise of the Prison Service, did not suggest that this required uncritical acceptance. Indeed, the tone of that decision suggested that the lack, in prisons, of facilities such as child care and time-out provisions, parent training and counselling, which had in the past provided a self-perpetuating justification for enforced separation of imprisoned mothers from their children, would no longer be sufficient to justify an infringement of Article 8 (see, for example, R v Governor HM Holloway Prison, ex parte L (1999) December 23, (unreported)). Against that context, therefore, the tendency in Munby J's judgment in CF to take the current limitations of the prison environment as inevitable and immutable is striking, and also somewhat disappointing.
Indeed, this decision affords little opportunity for innovative thinking about the ways in which a child's right to develop relationships with others could be respected without separation. 26, 1989) . That said, however, comparative experience from elsewhere does suggest that some fresh thinking around penal policy in general, and around the imprisonment conditions of women and mothers in particular, could play a vital role in permitting greater protection to Article 8 rights, as well as in ensuring that the best interests of individual children are safeguarded, both up to the 18 month age limit and some way beyond it.
At Askham Grange prison, it appears that a number of promising developments along these lines have already been undertaken. Its in-house nursery is attended not only by children resident in the prison, but also by fee-paying under threes from the local community. Children are taken swimming regularly and to a playgroup outside of the prison. What's more, mothers are directly encouraged to play with their children, to learn about health and nutrition and to go on day trips outside the prison grounds as a family (see J North, Getting it Right? Services for Pregnant Women, New Mothers, and Babies in Prison, The Maternity Alliance, 2005) . It is lamentable, therefore, that despite the fact that the mother in the CF case had been approved for a move to Askham Grange by the time of the court hearing, Munby J did not consider the ability of her child to develop relationships with others in furtherance of her Article 8 rights within this unit environment. 
CONCLUSION
There are clearly a number of difficult questions posed by the increasing rates of female incarceration and by the complex interface between dealing with women as offenders and as mothers. While prison mother and baby units should not necessarily be looked upon as the best overall or ultimate solution, they do have a vital role to play in those cases in which a custodial sentence is appropriate and yet separating a child from its mother at the point of imprisonment would have a detrimental impact.
While Munby J was certainly right to emphasise the independent demands of respecting a child's right to private life under Article 8 in this context, it is disappointing that he drew on such a restricted pallet to paint the picture of how such rights could, and could not, be protected in the prison environment. In a context in which many of the progressive possibilities for prison mother and baby units are yet to be seen, and in which open and semi-open prison facilities are yet to be seriously pursued, the point at which both welfare and rights considerations dictate that a child should be separated from its imprisoned mother remains uncertain.
What's more, in a context in which, as Katz concludes (in "Young lives, lost rights', action for prisoners," Action for Prisoners ' Families News, Autumn 2003, at p 17) that "large numbers of children (of imprisoned mothers) are in ad hoc, informal care arrangements…seldom checked by any statutory authority," we must surely question the extent to which we are in the end protecting these children by refusing them access to such mother and baby units.
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